DoD taking public comments

Date: Friday, October 06, 2006 7:16 PM

<<<<< JOB DESTRUCTION NEWSLETTER No. 1565 -- 10/06/2006 >>>>>

In August, I published a newsletter about how the Department of Defense
(DoD) was considering relaxing security requirements for foreign workers
that are taking jobs on military research contracts.

In it, I rebutted some of the DoD responses to a huge letter writing
campaign by special interest groups that demanded a reduction in security
requirements for foreign workers. The DoD didn't receive comments from
people from our side of the camp so it was a one-sided rout by the H-1B
advocates. It's possible there were some comments for our side that I
missed since the document is thousands of pages long, but there is
preponderance of comments that called for relaxed security and greater use
of foreign workers.

Using foreign workers and relaxing security are two faces of the same coin!

The first deadline for public comments was in September 2005, but
unexpectedly the DoD decided to extend the public comment period to October
13, 2006. The email I got from the DoD confirming the extension is included
below.

So far the only public comment that they have posted online is in support
of the position that no foreign workers should be used for military
contracts. The letter has strong evidence that H-1Bs have posed security
risks in the past and that the problem will get worse if the regulations
are relaxed.

NO COMMENTS HAVE BEEN POSTED FROM H-1B LOBBYISTS AND SHILLS!

So why have the shills been silent? I can only speculate on this one, but I
believe it's because they thought a victory was in-the-bag, so to speak.

There may be a small window of opportunity for us to thwart the lobbyists
by writing letters to the DoD to protest any weakening of security. Write
to them and explain why you think foreigners shouldn't be allowed to work
on government contracts. There are many reasons, but the one they will care
about the most is the obvious security risks of this kind of reckless
behavior. Arguing that H-1Bs are cheap labor might encourage them, so don't
play that card very aggressively.

I published two columns on the DoD issue.

The latest one is on Vdare. Be sure to follow up on their links. They also
have a paragraph about where to send comments.

http://www.vdare.com/sanchez/06105_dod.htm

I wrote a shorter version that was targeted for newspaper op-eds. It was
picked up by a syndicated editorial company and then the op-ed was sent out
to hundreds of newspapers, but unfortunately it hasn't been published.
These types of stories are a very tough sell in the mainstream media.

You can read that op-ed column here:

http://www.cap-s.org/newsroom/opinion_releases/sanchez_dod.html

If any of you are in the media and want to publish the column in your
newspaper, please contact CAP-S.org at:

http://www.cap-s.org/contact_us/address_and_phone.html

I am including the original newsletter below. It's not as well written as
the Vdare or CAP-S version because both of those were peer reviewed and
edited. The previous newsletter contains detailed information that might
help you if you care to send a comment to the DoD.

Your comments to the DoD are necessary to help save jobs for American
workers and to protect our national security and sovereignty. Don't
underestimate how much influence you can have over their decisions. Hope to
see your comment online at regulations.gov soon!

This newsletter is read by the shills, so don't expect them to remain
silent once this is sent out to the public. Get to work on this during the
weekend because there isn't much time left.

IMPORTANT: If you want to share your comments with me please forward the
email instead of CCing me.

WARNING: Everything you send to the DoD will go online even if you request
them not to post personal information. Just keep that in mind because you
might not want phone numbers or addresses to be posted. Look at the first
comment and you will see what I mean.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

-----Original Message-----
Date: Thursday, October 05, 2006 2:21 PM

In reference to document

http://www7.nationalacademies.org/stl/Federal_Register.htm

[DFARS Case 2004-D010]

Public Comment could be taken up to September 15, 2005.

The web page for comments is still open at:
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main

MY QUESTION:

Can the public still comment on this document either by email or by the web

form?

Rob Sanchez

Date: Friday, October 06, 2006 5:50 AM

Mr. Sanchez,

The public comment period for case 2004-D010 has been extended to October
13, 2006. Please submit your comments to dfars@osd.mil or post your
comment on www.regultionsgov.

Thanks you.
Defense Acquisition Regulations System (DARS)

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

<<<<< JOB DESTRUCTION NEWSLETTER No. 1544 -- 08/21/2006 >>>>>

One thing I hear from people over and over is a variation on the following
theme: "I'm going to get a job that requires a security clearance because
there is no way an H-1B will ever be allowed to work on secure government
contracts". That may have been true once, but as you will see, the
Department of Defense gave the green light for foreigners to work on secure
contracts -- and unlike you, they won't even be required to wear security
badges!

I recommend that you skip the rest of my commentary until you have read the
Boston Globe article because that will help you understand the big picture
first. Come back to this point to continue your reading for further
details on what this all means and why.

In 2005 universities and military contractors lobbied to sellout our
national security in the name of reducing the "burdens" of doing business.
The second article in this newsletter has more on the lobby effort. Also
read:

http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2004/0512visa.shtml
Leading Science, Higher-Education and Engineering Groups Urge Six
Improvements to U.S. Visa-Processing Quagmire

and this newsletter:
http://www.zazona.com/shameh1b/JobDestructionNews2004.htm
2004-05-23 Shortage of PhDs Scientists and Engineers

When I read the recent Boston Globe article titled "Defense Dept. won't
segregate foreign staffers" the first thing I did is to hunt down a few
government documents to either verify of disprove what was written (the
article seemed so far-fetched I thought I could easily discredit the
newspaper). My conclusion is that the Boston Globe article is very accurate
but incomplete.

The first document to view is the actual DoD rule changes. It's a huge
document, so allow me to highlight some of its worst sections (the
following analysis is not complete as there are plenty more foul sections
if you want to plod through the entire document.

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfars/changenotice/2006/20060814/E6-13290.htm
[Federal Register: August 14, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 156)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 46434-46440]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr14au06-32]

COMMENT FROM ROB: The DoD explained why they are loosening the security
regulations for foreign workers. Read this gobbledegook very carefully,
because what they are really saying is that the DoD doesn't have the
capability of knowing which documents are classified, and which aren't, so
instead of restricting documents, they will allow foreigners to be able to
have access to everything! I used to work on secret government contracts
and was subjected to continuous security checks, but of course that was in
the 1980s when the term "classified" really meant something. This is a
stunning admission by the DoD that they can no longer maintain secure
documents.

1. Boundaries of the Proposed Rule

a. Comment. Directly or indirectly, one hundred and thirteen

respondents recommended against adopting the proposed rule. This
negative feedback came primarily from the educational research
community.

DoD Response. DoD recognizes the respondents' concerns, and the

proposed rule has been substantially re-written in a way that addresses
many of the concerns, including those expressed by the research
community. The impetus for creating the rule was a Department of
Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) audit report which found that some
contractors granted foreign nationals access to unclassified export-
controlled technology without proper authorization. The DoDIG concluded
that the Department does not have adequate processes to identify
unclassified export-controlled information or technology, nor to
prevent unauthorized disclosure to foreign nationals by its
contractors. Based on these findings, DoD believes appropriate changes
to regulations or procedures are warranted.

COMMENT FROM ROB: The DoD has a simple justification for using foreign
workers. In their opinion foreign workers are smarter and of course it just
follows that we will not be able to maintain military superiority without
them. It's the old "dumb-lazy-American, smart-hard-working-foreigner"
argument.

2. Foreign Participation in U.S. Federally-Sponsored Research Projects

a. Comment. Fifty-six respondents asserted that the proposed rule

would harm national security. These respondents asserted that foreign
scientists and researchers add more to the U.S. research enterprise
than they take away. In some fields, foreign researchers are ahead of
their U.S. counterparts. Restricting participation in DoD-funded
research may deprive the United States of capabilities that result in
essential contributions to maintaining U.S. military superiority.

COMMENT FROM ROB: The DoD came to the conclusion that maintaining security
is just too much of a burden on military contractors. When I worked on
military contracts in the 1980s security was just considered part of the
cost of doing business. That of course is old-school thinking. Now the
government's mission is remove these costly and inconvenient burdens from
contractors. Pay particular attention to the documents called ITAR and EAR
- I will explain why later.

3. Administrative Burden and Cost-Effectiveness of Proposed Solutions
to the Underlying Export Control Issues

a. Comment. Forty-four respondents expressed concerns about the

additional administrative burden of the proposed rule. These
respondents asserted that the proposed rule appeared to mandate
compliance system requirements beyond those required in the ITAR and
the EAR.

DoD Response. DoD recognizes this concern, and appropriate

revisions have been made to the rule. This second proposed rule
requires contractors to comply with their responsibilities under the
ITAR and the EAR when export-controlled information or technology will
be generated or accessed in the performance of the contract.

b. Comment. Ninety-two respondents expressed concern with the

requirement to issue badges to research participants.

DoD Response. As noted in the responses to comments 1.b., 1.h., and

2.g., the proposed rule has been changed to eliminate separate DoD
requirements on export control compliance programs, and instead
includes references to the Department of State for the ITAR and the
Department of Commerce for the EAR. The Department of State and the
Department of Commerce have responsibility for overseeing compliance
with ITAR and EAR requirements.

c. Comment. Six respondents asserted that the proposed rule would

impose a training burden.

DoD Response. The rule was not intended to place unique DoD

compliance burdens on the contractor. Therefore, the specific language
related to training has been removed.

d. Comment. Two respondents expressed concerns related to the

rule's impact on access to research equipment that is export-
controlled.

DoD Response. Since the proposed rule is focused on reminding

contractors of their responsibility to comply with the ITAR and the
EAR, access to research equipment is considered to be outside the scope
of this proposed rule. DoD recommends that the respondents refer
concerns on this matter to the Department of Commerce or the Department
of State, as appropriate.

COMMENT FROM ROB: Just to make sure there is no confusion about what types
of research is being talked about here, I copied this section of text which
explains what types of research foreign workers will have access to.

REQUIREMENTS REGARDING ACCESS TO EXPORT-CONTROLLED INFORMATION OR
TECHNOLOGY--FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH (XXX 2006)

(a) Definitions. As used in this clause--
Applied research means the effort that--
(1) Normally follows basic research, but may not be severable

from the related basic research;

(2) Attempts to determine and exploit the potential of

scientific discoveries or improvements in technology, materials,
processes, methods, devices, or techniques; and

(3) Attempts to advance the state of the art.
Basic research means that research directed toward increasing

knowledge in science. The primary aim of basic research is a fuller
knowledge or understanding of the subject under study, rather than
any practical application of that knowledge.

Export-controlled information and technology means information

and technology subject to export controls established in the Export
Administration Regulations (15 CFR parts 730-774) or the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 CFR parts 120-130).

[[Page 46440]]

Fundamental research, as defined by National Security Decision

Directive 189, means basic and applied research in science and
engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and
shared broadly within the scientific community. This is
distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial
development, design, production, and product utilization, the
results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or
national security reasons.

COMMENT FROM ROB: When I worked on government contracts, every document was
classified as non-confidential, company proprietary, confidential, secret,
or top secret. Engineers and other workers never had a question how
documents were classifed, who had access to them, and there was no doubt
which areas were secured because they were all locked and there were large
warning signs that unauthorized were not to enter. Personnel without secure
clearances were never allowed in areas with these documents or in places
with related equipment - even janitors had to have security clearances. Now
the DoD has decided that contractors don't have to "segregate" foreign
workers from any of the secure areas. That would have never happened in the
past, but of course that was before politically correct-think made the word
"segregate" a dirty word.

[[Page 46437]]

g. Comment. Sixty-three respondents objected to segregated work

areas.

DoD Response. As noted in the responses to comments 1.b. and 1.h.,

the proposed rule has been changed to eliminate separate DoD
requirements on export control compliance programs, and instead
includes references to the Department of State for the ITAR and the
Department of Commerce for the EAR. Thus, a specific DoD requirement
for segregated work areas has been removed from the proposed rule.

[[Page 46437]]

g. Comment. Sixty-three respondents objected to segregated work

areas.

DoD Response. As noted in the responses to comments 1.b. and 1.h.,

COMMENT FROM ROB: The following section is probably the most important as
far as this newsletter is concerned because it defines what foreign workers
will get a free ride on security. It's not an impressive section of text
upon first reading, but note the references to the ITAR and EAR documents.

[[Page 46437]]

export controlled information or technology or classified information
is involved). However, DoD believes that mandating this notification
for all contracts is unnecessary.

d. Comment. Ten respondents were concerned that the proposed rule

used the terms ``foreign national'' and ``foreign person,'' but did not
define these terms.

DoD Response. In response to this comment, the proposed rule has

been revised to refer to the ITAR and the EAR for applicable
definitions.

COMMENT FROM ROB: So here it is folks, the infamous ITAR document. If that
first sentence about "natural person" doesn't set your alarm bells off,
then you just haven't been paying attention!

http://www.pmdtc.org/docs/itar/itar_part_120.pdf
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)

' 120.16 Foreign person.
Foreign persons means any natural person who is not a lawful
permanent resident as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20) or who is
not a protected individual as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(3).
It also means any foreign corporation, business association,
partnership, trust, society or any other entity or group that is
not incorporated or organized to do business in the United States,
as well as international organizations, foreign governments and
any agency or subdivision of foreign governments (e.g. diplomatic

missions).

COMMENT FROM ROB: The EAR "Export Regulations Administration" uses the term
"natural person in many places. They define the term on this page:

http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/txt/772.txt

Person. A natural person, including a citizen or national of the
United States or of any foreign country; any firm; any government,
government agency, government department, or government
commission; any labor union; any fraternal or social organization;
and any other association or organization whether or not organized
for profit. This definition does not apply to part 760 of the
EAR (Restrictive Trade Practices or Boycotts).

CONCLUDING COMMENT FROM ROB: The reference to natural persons is very
significant once you know what the term means. Use of this phrase is a very
important clue that the DoD is tying our security decisions with our
international trade agreements. This mundane sounding paragraph is truly
revolutionary!

To go further you must understand what the term "natural person" means.
It's a term that is defined by the WTO and GATS in Mode 4 - the "Movement
of natural persons". Mode 4 covers all international workers -- especially
those that use visas such as H-1B, L-1, TN, and J-1.

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/mouvement_persons_e/mouvement_persons_e.htm

Movement of natural persons refers to the entry
and temporary stay of persons for the purpose of
providing a service. It does not relate to persons
seeking citizenship, permanent employment or permanent
residence in a country.

For further reading on "natural persons" and Mode 4, click this link:

http://www.thesocialcontract.com/cgi-bin/showarticle.pl?articleID=1201&terms=

Let's go back and look at Section #3 to fully understand what the DoD is
really up to:

the proposed rule has been changed to eliminate separate DoD
requirements on export control compliance programs, and instead
includes references to the Department of State for the ITAR and the
Department of Commerce for the EAR. The Department of State and the
Department of Commerce have responsibility for overseeing compliance
with ITAR and EAR requirements.

It appears that the DoD is using administrative procedures to force the
Pentagon to comply with WTO free-trade mandates! That is a gross violation
of our national security and sovereignty.

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